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1: Introduction 
This paper examines the effects of financialisation on large-firm management strategy in the 
extractive industries, and the accompanying developmental implications. It does so through a 
case study of South African platinum-group metal (PGM) mining since the transition to 
democracy in the mid-1990s. During this time, the South African economy underwent far-
reaching liberalisation which has led to deepening processes of financialisation, with 
consequences for changes in management strategy (Ashman et al, 2011). As the paper 
describes, for the major South African mining companies integrated in increasingly globalised 
capital markets, this created intensified competitive pressures around the creation of 
shareholder value. Drawing on a wider conceptual literature on the financialisation of the firm, 
the paper explores how this change manifested in the strategies employed by the then three 
largest PGM mining companies, Lonmin,1 Impala Platinum Holdings (Implats) and Anglo-
American Platinum (Amplats), during the long commodities boom of the 2000s and subsequent 
period of volatility and slump from 2009-2016 (Morgan, 2014: Froud et al, 2006; Erturk et al, 
2008; Leaver & Martin, 2017; Lazonick, 2010; Fligstein and Shin, 2007). Using detailed 
documentary analysis of company annual reports, analyst reports and company accounts, the 
paper demonstrates how pressures to deliver increased shareholder value during the boom years 
resulted in large cash distributions to investors, balance sheet engineering and costly outlays 
on expansion and M&A activity. The paper argues that this was in part propelled by narratives 
about the commodities’ ‘super-cycle’, which provided a rationale for increased risk-taking 
among company management, stock-market analysts and major institutional investors. The 
                                                            
1 At the time of writing, Lonmin is being purchased by Sibanye-Stillwater. This follows several PGM asset 
purchases since 2016 which make it the second largest platinum producer in the world. However, the company 
was not engaged in PGM production for the period covered in this paper. 
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result, the paper shows, was balance sheet fragility and excess capacity which has exacerbated 
the impact of the slump in subsequent years.  
The paper has implications for both the study of the extractive industries and development, and 
for a growing literature on financialisation and development in the Global South (Mawdsley, 
2016). Within this literature there has been relatively little attention to financialisation of large 
firm strategy and its implications for downstream upstream extractive industries (though see 
de los Reyes, 2016). The paper’s key argument is that financialisation of large mining firms 
has exacerbated the already intense inherent volatility of the extractive industries, with harmful 
consequences for development. As discussed in Section 2, cyclicality and instability is inherent 
to industrial mining by virtue of its specific features as a landed, capital intensive industry. 
However, as the article shows, financialisation of firm compelled management strategies which 
amplified this, creating acute distributional conflict and instability.  
Secondly, the argument has implications for broader efforts to understand forms and 
consequences of financialisation in the South African political economy. PGM mining has 
particular significance here. While mining has been declining as a share of South African GDP 
for decades – from a high of 20% in 1980 to 8% in 20172 – it remains a pivotally important 
sector because of its linkages and multipliers, and its large contribution to export revenues. 
Within mining, PGM is the largest sub-sector by employment and, in many years, export 
earnings also. With more than 80% of global reserves in a geological formation known as the 
Bushveld Complex, South Africa is the world’s most important platinum producer. Driven by 
growing demand from auto-catalyst manufacturing – the major source of demand for platinum 
and palladium – PGM mining grew rapidly in the post-apartheid period, with employment 
doubling to 200,000 between 1994 and a 2008 peak, while the historically dominant gold 
mining industry’s fell from 400,000 to 165,000.3 However, PGM mining has been politically 
as well as economically significant, as the locus of the most severe instances of labour conflict 
in South Africa’s post-apartheid history. The 2012 Marikana massacre, in which the South 
African police force shot dead 34 striking Lonmin workers, was the worst single incident of 
state killing since the 1960 Sharpeville massacre. Continuing demands for a ‘living wage’ 
resulted in a five-month strike by mine-workers in 2014, which was the longest in South 
African history. The paper argues that financialisation has exacerbated distributional tensions 
in the sector, as management has sought to restore internationally competitive rates of return 
                                                            
2 South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin 
3 Department of Mineral Resources data 
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on capital through redundancies, mine closures and asset sales. These distributional tensions 
relate both to the historical circumstances of entrenched racialised inequality in post-apartheid 
South Africa, and the specificities of the conventional platinum mining business model that is 
both highly labor-intensive, by the standards of mining, and dependent on sustained high levels 
of fixed capital investment by virtue of its challenging geology. This paper contributes to 
literature seeking to understand the overlapping social, economic and political tensions of the 
South African mining industry (Mnwana & Capps, 2015; Forrest, 2015; Chinguno, 2015; 
Bezuidenhout & Buhlungu, 2010; Berresford, 2016), and the post-apartheid economy more 
broadly (von Holdt, 2013; Hart, 2013; Marais, 2011; Bond, 2005).  The first section of the 
paper reviews relevant literature on financialisation of the firm and the extractive industries 
and development. The second and third sections examine the processes of deepening 
financialisation in PGM mining and how this manifested in changes to management strategy. 
The fourth section discusses the broader implications of the findings. 
 
2: Literature review 
The most commonly employed definition of financialisation is ‘the increasing role of financial 
motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions’ in economic life (Epstein, 
2005: 3). There is a large literature exploring the phenomenon on multiple levels, from the 
household to national economies (see van der Swan, 2014; Davis & Kim, 2015 for reviews). 
One of the most significant areas of enquiry has been financialisation of the large firm, with 
scholars exploring the growing importance of capital market pressures in shaping corporate 
strategy in major Western economies, and its socio-economic implications. There has, 
however, been relatively little investigation of this for the Global South, and in particular the 
extractive industries. This section first reviews key literature on financialisation of the firm, 
before outlining its relevance to scholarship on financialisation in the South and the extractive 
industries in development. 
At its most fundamental level, financialisation of the large firm is associated with the increasing 
primacy of short-term shareholder value delivery as a management objective. This emerged 
from a series of intersecting changes in the world’s advanced economies in the late 20th 
Century. Financial de-regulation, pension reforms, and globalisation increased the amount of 
capital available for stock markets and its mobility, and augmented the size and influence of 
institutional investors vis-à-vis retail investors (Stockhammer, 2004; Krippner, 2012; Epstein, 
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2005). These shifts in the organizational field for large firms, and the accompanying pressure 
and monitoring from institutional investors, re-shaped management agency and norms 
(Fligstein, 1990). This involved the growing prominence of what Fligstein called the finance, 
and later, ‘shareholder value conception of control’ in US management discourse and practice, 
whereby the firm was re-conceived as “a collection of assets that could and should be 
manipulated to increase short-term profits” (Ibid: 226), and appraised by financial metrics 
rather than product-market measures of success – in particular the share price (Fligstein, 2001). 
Alongside growing conformity around the primacy of shareholder value as a strategic objective 
were shifting means to deliver it. This involved increased use of balance sheet engineering, 
corporate restructuring and M&A activity aimed at improving key shareholder value 
accounting metrics and short-term share price performance relative to peers, as opposed to 
more conventional forms of product market competition around market share and 
Schumpeterian rents (Fligstein and Shin, 2007; Froud et al, 2006). In particular, hostility 
mounted towards multi-sector diversified conglomerates, which were presented as un-
transparent for investors, unmanageable for executives and as such obstructive to shareholder 
value delivery: the appropriate response therefore being to sell business units which did not 
reflect ‘core competencies’ (Davis, Diekmann & Tinsley, 1994). In addition to this was an 
increased emphasis on distributing available cash to shareholders through higher dividends and 
share buy-backs, and correspondingly increased pressure to lower expenditure on labour, 
outlays on capital goods, and in particular riskier longer-term investments such as R&D, while 
increasing higher-yield financial investments (Lazonick, 2010; Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000). 
These shifts, and the pressures for conformity thereof in management strategy, were entrenched 
by increased use of variable pay instruments tying executive remuneration to financial metrics. 
On a macro-economic level, the consequences of shareholder revolution for firm strategy were 
found to be causally related to a broader slowdown in accumulation in advanced industrial 
economies as investment in capital goods decreased (Stockhammer, 2004).  
Besides responding to the increased power of institutional investors, these strategic shifts were 
legitimated by arguments from neoclassical theorists presenting more focused pursuit of 
shareholder value as aligning with wider social welfare (Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000). 
Chiefly, among a firm’s stakeholders, employees, creditors and governments are assured 
contractually of their claims on the firm’s cash, while shareholders receive the residual after 
these claims are met. As such, they are, it is argued, the only actor properly incentivized to 
drive operating efficiency and resolve the principal agent problem (Jensen, 2002; Fama & 
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Jensen, 1983; Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000: 27-28; Lazonick, 2007: 985). Distribution of the 
residual thereby represents a necessary reward for disciplining management, who would 
otherwise wastefully misallocate capital, and hence also a means of ensuring efficient capital 
allocation across the economy as a whole (Jensen, 1986; Lazonick, 2007: 986; Fligstein and 
Shin, 2007: 403).  
As scholars in cultural political economy assert, an additional characteristic of the financialised 
firm was the growing importance of narrative management in corporate strategy (Froud et al, 
2006; Thrift, 2005). Despite increased sophistication in company valuation, investment still 
rests heavily upon subjective judgement, with “[w]hat ‘the market wants’…as much a 
moveable discursive construct as a set of fixed financial targets” (Froud et al, 2014: 48). As 
such, companies devoted increasing time to communicating a ‘story of purpose and 
achievement’, and narrativising growth prospects (Froud et al, 2006: 100). These can be 
temporarily self-fulfilling, as for example in the dot-com bubble and pre-2007 securitization 
boom (Thrift, 2005: 112-129; Engelen et al, 2011), but more often than not prove to be a 
‘rhetoric that disappoints’ since capital market pressures force management into a ‘utopian 
quest for growth and higher returns whose uncertain consequences include a gap between 
saying and doing’ (Froud et al, 2006: 42).  
Most literature on financialisation has focused on Anglo-Saxon economies, although there is a 
growing array of studies exploring the forms and developmental implications of 
financialisation in the Global South (Karwowski & Stockhammer, 2017; Mawdsley, 2016; 
Bracking, 2016; Bayliss, 2014; Hardie, 2011; Bonizi, 2013; Roy, 2010; Soederberg, 2013). 
However, there is relatively little research exploring the developmental consequences of 
financialisation of large firm strategy. An important exception comes from literature on global 
production networks (GPN). One of the key strategic responses to increased capital market 
pressures from major Western manufacturing was an aggressive geographical repositioning 
and vertical disintegration of production networks to exploit lower labour costs in emerging 
markets for low value-added activities (Gibbon, Bair & Ponte, 2008; Coe & Yeung, 2015; 
Froud et al, 2014). There is, as Morgan (2014) argues, an interdependence between the 
globalisation of multinational corporate activity through the spatial re-articulation of 
production networks and the rise of financialisation, both facilitated by neoliberal reforms. 
Contestation between the disparate actors constituting GPNs – including both firm and extra-
firm actors –  over distribution of the value produced by the activity has obvious developmental 
implications (Coe & Yeung, 2015). This contestation is intensified by raised shareholder value 
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expectations for lead firms and shortened investment time-horizons, with financialisation of 
lead firm strategy resulting in pressures to pass risk to and extract value from suppliers, the 
labour force and host governments and communities (Milberg & Winkler, 2010; Milberg, 
2008; Gibbon, 2008; Froud et al, 2014).  
However, outsourced export-orientated manufacturing is spatially concentrated in more 
successful emerging market economies, and for many countries in the Global South integration 
with GPNs continues to centre around primary commodities (UNCTAD, 2017). This is 
particularly so in most African countries (Ibid), and for South Africa, where primary minerals 
account for upwards of 20% of total exports (Chamber of Mines, 2016). Research on 
financialisation here has focused on the downstream of primary soft-commodity GPNs, for 
example, in the increasingly speculative nature of food commodity markets and the 
consequences thereof for producers and consumers, and the financialisation of supermarkets 
and multinational agri-business intermediaries which act as lead firms in food-commodity 
GPNs (von Braun et al, 2014; Clapp, 2014; Isakson, 2014; Borras et al, 2016; Newman, 2009). 
There is, however, relatively little research on financialisation of the firm in upstream 
extractive industries (though see De los Reyes, 2016 and Parker et al, 2017), and this is a gap 
the paper seeks to address.  
Extractive industry companies are frequently among the largest investors, export revenue-
generators and formal private sector employers in many resource-rich developing countries. 
There is, correspondingly, a large literature on the role of extractive industry firms in 
development, analysing relationships between multinational companies, host governments and 
communities, and the developmental challenges deriving from the production and contestation 
of resource rents (Bebbington et al, 2008; Rajak & Gilberthorpe, 2017; Gilberthorpe & 
Papyrakis, 2015). Setting aside major state-owned companies in many emerging economies, 
the capital intensive nature of industrial-scale extraction means mining companies tend to be 
integrated with global capital markets, raising equity predominantly on the stock exchanges of 
London, Toronto, Sydney and to a lesser extent Johannesburg. Stock market competition 
among the major listed mining groups is fierce (Humphreys, 2015). Nonetheless, there has 
been little consideration within the extractives and development literature of the effects of 
financialisation of management strategy among large mining companies as anything other than 
a contextual backdrop. Addressing this gap can enrich the understanding of both how 
financialisation effects resource-rich developing economies, and how financialisation of the 
firm plays out in different industries. 
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It is important to first consider how the specific characteristics of mining as an economic 
activity may interact with processes of financialisation. An exception to the general lack of 
research on financialisation of upstream extractive industry firms in developing countries this 
is work by de los Reyes (2016) on gold mining, which explores the manifestations of 
financialisation in the gold industry during the 2000s commodities boom in pressures from 
institutional investors for rapid M&A-led growth and large dividend payments. “From such 
speculative highs”, de los Reyes notes, “the adjustment that followed was just as disruptive 
with the sudden withdrawal of capital, unravelling some of the capital commitments made 
previously” (Ibid: 12). The patterns described are in many respects similar to financialisation 
of firm strategy in other sectors. However, as Parker et al (2017) highlight, there is one highly 
significant distinction to address in discussions of financialisation of mining: its landed nature.  
Industrial mining tends to be a ‘point source’ industry. That is, as opposed to ‘diffuse source’ 
resource-based industries such as agriculture, mining tends to exhibit high levels of geographic 
concentration around particular locales where minerals are economically viable to extract 
(Auty, 2001).4 For mining, therefore, geological properties “set absolute and relative physical 
limits on the course of industrial development and competition” (Capps, 2012, 66). Mining 
lead-firms cannot spatially re-articulate their production networks in response to crises of 
profitability or changing social and political conditions in the same way, for example, as 
manufacturing companies can do in the era of globalisation (Bridge, 2008, Parker et al, 2017). 
This point-source character also tends to result in concentrated ownership, since viable deposits 
may only be accessed by small numbers of firms at sufficient economies of scale (Auty, 2001). 
This creates the propensity for correspondingly high concentration of resource rents, with 
consequences for inequality on local and national levels (Ibid; Thorp et al, 2012; Le Billon, 
2012). Crucially, however, this is mediated by landed property, which, as discussed below, is 
a key barrier to accumulation in mining (Capps, 2012).  
A further, but inter-related, distinctive feature of industrial mining is its capital intensity. 
Extraction tends to be costly and technologically complex, not least because accompanying 
infrastructure often has to be built from scratch to make deposits accessible. New projects 
typically require large up-front fixed costs subject to long pay-back periods, exposed to high 
commodity price risk (Runge, 1998). This is particularly so for deep-level hard-rock mining 
                                                            
4 These generalisations preclude the fact that many forms of artisanal mining more closely resemble diffuse-
source activities, while some forms of highly-capital intensive plantation agriculture can more closely resemble 
‘point-source’ activities (Auty, 2001: 6) 
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such as gold and platinum in South Africa. Besides compelling concentration of ownership, 
this also contributes towards the high levels of price volatility which are inherent to mineral 
commodity markets. Demand for minerals is highly cyclical, but added to this the capital 
intensity of production and long lead-times for new capacity means there is, in most mineral-
commodity categories, low price elasticity of supply (Ibid). This creates the potential for price 
spikes related to under-supply, and prolonged price slumps when excessively-optimistic capital 
expenditure creates a glut. This is common to most capital intensive industries, from steel to 
shipping logistics. However, in mining access to and control of reserves mediates firms’ ability 
to grow and to navigate these fluctuations. Companies must continually seek access to new 
reserves (Fine, 1994), while ideally consolidate to prevent over-exploitation of existing 
reserves. This “search for access inevitably puts [extractive] firms into relation with those 
actors and communities who currently hold rights to lands and resources” (Bridge 2008: 406; 
Capps, 2012). 
Financialisation pressures may exacerbate such tensions. As opposed to lower-risk investments 
in less volatile industries such as industrials or utilities – the overwhelming focus of studies of 
financialisation of the firm – investors in the extractives tolerate high levels of risk in the 
expectation that companies can generate large capital gains and cash distributions during 
fleeting periods of boom (Rudenno, 2012). During such booms, therefore, “rapid extraction of 
large volumes of resources becomes a primary driver of firm strategy” (Parker et al, 2017: 18), 
and correspondingly there is pressure to expand production via new reserves.  
There are important corresponding implications for understandings of the financialisation of 
the firm. Contrary to established literature on financialisation of the firm that sees 
financialisation diminishing the tendency for long-term investment in capital goods vis-a-vis 
either financial investment or distributions to shareholders (E.g. Lazonick, 2010; 
Stockhammer, 2004), in the extractive industries the necessity for firms to generate shareholder 
value by responding rapidly to upswings in the commodities cycle to increase output creates 
an inclination towards sudden and euphoric surges of high-risk capital investment. 
Financialization is, as Lazonick (2010) argues, not simply generative of inequality between 
shareholders and other non-financial stakeholders, but instability also as managers stretch 
balance sheets in pursuit of improved shareholder returns on capital (See also Fligstein and 
Shin, 2007). As discussed in Section 4 below, intensified boom-time shareholder demands on 
mining companies manifested not simply in increased cash distribution to shareholders and 
increasing leverage, but on creating a suitably large pipeline of growth projects that would 
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enable companies to reap the benefits of the anticipated ‘commodities supercycle’. This 
generates risks both in terms of balance sheet fragility and excess capacity. As will be argued, 
financialisation of the firm thereby amplifies the inherent volatility of the mining industry. 
This in turn, has important consequences for thinking about industrial mining and development. 
As Parker et al argue, there is “a tension between the de-territorialization tendencies of global 
financial markets and the localization pressures associated with rapid resource extraction that 
vary across the boom–bust cycle” (Ibid: 18-19). Financialisation is an abstractive force, 
conceptualising the firm as a bundle of assets which must be continually reshuffled and 
adjusted to achieve competitive rates of return in response to changes in market prices (Morgan, 
2014), while mining as a landed industry is an inherently place specific activity, tied 
unavoidably by geology to specific extra-firm actors such as the labour force, communities and 
national governments, in a manner which more geographically mobile industries are not. The 
amplified volatility which financialisation of the firm creates will have more severe social 
consequences in a developing-country context with high levels of poverty, inequality and 
unemployment, where many livelihoods are directly dependent on or affected by mining, and 
where expectations of the mining industry’s developmental contribution is often very high 
(Bebbington et al, 2008). 
 
3: Financialisation, internationalisation and corporate restructuring   
This section provides context on the rise of shareholder value pressures in the South African 
mining industry in a context of increased liberalisation and financialisation in the South African 
economy in the early post-apartheid period stemming from a neoliberal economic reform 
process. For PGM mining, this entailed mining companies being unbundled from larger 
diversified conglomerates, integrated within increasingly internationalised capital markets and 
subject to increasingly speculative, short-termist investor pressures as the minerals commodity 
boom got underway in the late 1990s. Economic liberalisation in South Africa had been 
partially initiated in the late-apartheid period, but was fully embraced after 1996 when the ANC 
shifted from an initially social democratic policy programme to the neoliberal Growth 
Employment and Redistribution programme. This shift has been extensively analysed 
elsewhere (e.g. Ashman et al, 2011; Bond, 2000: Marais, 2011). For this article, it is important 
to note that alongside fiscal austerity and tight monetary policy, the programme involved 
extensive financial market liberalisation and lowering of capital and exchange controls, the 
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purpose being integration with the global economy and attraction of foreign investment 
(Ashman et al, 2011). This began a process of financialisation of the South African economy, 
which manifested in changes to the strategy and structure of big business.  
Diversified conglomerates had been a dominant form of mid-20th capitalism in most major 
economies, but South Africa represented a particularly extreme variant in levels of 
consolidation. At the transition to democracy, six conglomerates controlled around 85% of the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange’s (JSE) value, with Anglo American the largest (Chabane et al, 
2006: 553).5 This partly reflected economic isolation which compelled domestic investment of 
surplus, but more so a highly specific system of accumulation that Fine and Rustomjee (1996) 
call the minerals-energy complex (MEC): with conglomerates centred around mining and with 
oligopolistic control of finance and heavy industry, supported and enabled by close 
relationships between government and business (Ibid). Scale also enabled conglomerates to 
mobilise financial resources sufficient to fund the enormous investments required to access 
South Africa’s deep-lying precious metals (Innes, 1994; Robinson, 2012). However, as 
mentioned in the preceding section, mainstream financial thinking had turned against 
conglomerates, with concerns over transparency meaning their shares tended to trade at a 
discount to asset values. Unlocking this latent shareholder value required restructuring into 
more coherent, focused entities, which would be simpler to manage, and furthermore could be 
externally analysed, accurately valued, and benchmarked against comparable peers and 
ultimately thereby disciplined by investors (Davis, Diekmann & Tinsley, 1994). These market 
demands partially aligned with the transformation strategy of the ANC government. Early 
approaches to black economic empowerment (BEE) strategies who sought to reduce white 
dominance of key sectors and further black ownership through asset divestures from the 
conglomerates (Chabane et al, 2005; Southall, 2004; Zalk, 2017). The conglomerates rapidly 
unbundled during the 1990s and early 2000s, producing more sectorally-focused stand-alone 
businesses, particularly in mining. Accompanying this was a strategic shift from corporate 
management to internationalisation, with several of the largest South African companies 
moving their primary listing to the London Stock Exchange. 
These broad changes in corporate strategy were reflected in the trajectories of the three largest 
PGM mining companies which are the focus of this article: Amplats, Implats and Lonmin. 
                                                            
5 These were Anglo (38.9%), Sanlam (12.7%), Stanbic/Liberty life (5.8%), Rembrandt/Remgro (13.2%), SA 
Mutual/Old Mutual (11.2%), Anglovaal (3.1%), these are figures for the 1991-1995 period (Chabane et al, 2005: 
553) 
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PGM production in the late apartheid period was almost entirely accounted for by three 
companies which formed parts of larger conglomerates, who during apartheid had secured 
control of key mineral deposits through a combination of large portfolios of privately owned 
mineral property rights, and deals with Homeland governments, whose land overlay large 
sections of the Bushveld Complex (Capps, 2012). The largest was Rustenburg Platinum Mines 
(RPM), controlled by Anglo American via Johannesburg Consolidated Investments (JCI), 
Implats controlled by Gencor, and Lonplats, controlled by Lonrho. Amplats was created from 
RPM and JCI and Anglo American’s other platinum assets, and listed on the JSE in 1997, with 
Anglo American retaining a controlling interest. Two years later Anglo American moved its 
primary listing and headquarters to London, claiming the move would eliminate a 25% 
discount on its shares and ease access to capital (Cohen, 2016). In the more competitive, 
shareholder value-orientated culture of the London investment and analyst community, the 
financial performance of Anglo and its charges became subject to intense scrutiny. In fulfilment 
of investor demands, management shed industrial assets to focus on mining, and began 
diversifying its mining assets away from South Africa, competing directly in shareholder value 
delivery with the other London-listed diversified mining companies such as Rio Tinto and BHP 
Billiton (Anglo American, 2003, 2004 & 2005).  
Implats emerged from the mining conglomerate Gencor. Having divested non-mining assets 
and its non-precious metals division, Billiton, to list in London in 1997, Gencor’s 46.5% stake 
in JSE-listed Impala became its only significant asset (RBC Dominion Securities, 2001). This 
was unbundled in 2003, with Implats the same year disposing of its 27% stake in the key 
subsidiary of fellow PGM miner, Lonmin (Implats, 2003: 8). Lonmin itself was created from 
the mining assets of London-listed but Africa-focused conglomerate Lonrho. Following the 
1993 defeat of Lonrho’s infamous chief executive, Tiny Rowland, the company responded to 
investor pressure by selling off non-core assets (CIBC Wood Gundy, 1999). Mining assets 
were spun into Lonmin in 1996, which quickly sold its gold and coal operations to focus on 
PGMs, which it dubbed the “metal of the future” (Lonmin, 2001).  
This process of restructuring and embedding in international capital markets took place 
alongside the onset of a boom in mineral commodity prices, driven by a long period of global 
growth and the increased demand for industrial metals generated by Chinese urbanisation and 
industrialisation. This subsequently became popularly referred to as the commodities 
‘supercycle’, with the argument behind the term being that the upturn in mineral prices would 
last longer than a conventional minerals price cycle. As discussed below, mining company 
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executives were enthusiastic proponents of this narrative when speaking to the markets. As 
Humphreys (2015) describes, after decades in which mineral prices had been subdued and 
mining seen as a generally low-growth and high-risk investment, these events transformed 
investor perceptions. Major listed mining companies became the object of heightened 
speculative interest (Ibid; Bridge, 2004). This was particularly so for PGM mining. The 
primary use of platinum and palladium is in catalytic converters, and with new clean air 
legislation being introduced worldwide, demand for the metal grew substantially. Having been 
largely flat for the prior decade, from the late 1990s, platinum prices doubled in less than five 
years (Figure 1).  
The three companies described above controlled more than 90% of South African platinum 
output in the mid-1990s. Though this figure subsequently declined with new entrants to the 
sector and use of joint-ventures in response to BEE legislation and as a means of alignment 
with tribal authorities, whose land overlay key deposits and were therefore key mediators of 
the industry’s expansion (Author, 2018; Mnwana & Capps, 2015) (Figure 2), the sector 
remained consolidated around these three companies, which besides dominating mined output 
also controlled smelting and refining operations. Combined with the fact that all were 
producing a generic commodity in refined metals, the booming demand for PGMs meant that 
product market competition was less significant relative to capital market competition.  
 
Figure 1: Platinum price 1994-2015 (US$/ounce) 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
$/oz
13 
 
Source: Bloomberg Data. 
6 
Figure 2: Structure of South African platinum production, 1997-2016  
Source: Company reports. 
As witnessed elsewhere as a feature of financialisation, investment strategies toward the sector 
became increasingly short-termist, manifesting in shorter durations of asset holding and 
pressure on management to deliver shareholder value over a shorter time horizon (Haldane, 
2010; Orhangazi, 2010). This change was observed by analysts. As one in 2002 stated, “the 
majority of PGM investors are far more geared to a three-month view” of the sector, with only 
a minority being “fundamental long-term participants” of three to five years (ING Financial 
Markets, 2002: 30). Average stock holding periods on the JSE declined from 15 years in the 
1980s to one year in the late 1990s following the introduction of electronic trading (Lamprecht, 
2013). This is reflected in the JSE listed Amplats and Implats. In terms of the former, its 
predecessor RPM had a free-float average share holding period of four years in the early 1990s, 
but by the mid-2000s this had fallen to below one year.7 For Implats, a more liquid stock given 
its larger free-float, the change was more dramatic, with average holding periods falling to a 
                                                            
6 ‘Own-mine’ refers to production from mines which are wholly-owned and controlled by the company in 
question (notwithstanding minority BEE share ownership) rather than operated as joint-ventures.  
7 Author’s calculations from Bloomberg Data and Company Accounts. 
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few months through the 2000s.8 Alongside the speed of turnover was a shift in the geographical 
composition of the shareholder base. Besides Lonmin and Amplats (through its majority 
shareholder, Anglo American) ties to the London Stock Exchange, there were large increases 
in foreign institutional investors in the JSE. This meant, for example, that at the height of the 
boom in 2007, South African-domiciled investors made up only half of the Implats shareholder 
base (Implats, 2006: 23).9 This embedding within increasingly mobile and interconnected 
international capital markets entailed, firstly, that shareholder expectations of the sector’s 
financial performance would be assessed with regard to opportunity costs of other potential 
investments worldwide, a process of abstraction which added to the demands placed on 
management to deliver short-term returns. Additionally, as Morgan (2014) has argued, the pre-
eminence of the key financial centres in the US and Europe as nodes in the global financial 
system for the major capital market intermediaries and institutional investors, has served to 
diffuse Anglo-Saxon norms for corporate governance and strategy, in a manner which 
undermines some historical institutionalist understandings of multinational firms as being 
shaped primarily by their immediate domestic context (See also Morgan & Hull Kristensen, 
2006). These factors combined to exert a mimetic pressure to adopt generic strategies for the 
delivery of shareholder value. Reinforcing this, the PGM companies began adopting 
increasingly complex executive remuneration schemes tied to relative performance in 
shareholder value metrics.  
The following section examines how these pressures manifested in company strategy, and the 
consequences thereof. It is important to first provide some context. As Froud et al (2006) 
note, financialisation does not produce predictable, homogenous outcomes and shareholder 
value often proves a “rhetoric which disappoints” because companies’ financial performance 
is always partly determined by external variables beyond management’s control. This is 
particularly so for PGM mining companies, which are ultimately price-takers on international 
markets for a generic and easily substitutable commodity. Recalling the price trends in Figure 
1 above, the financial performance of the three major PGM mining companies over the two 
decades studied here can be split into two periods of extreme contrast. First, a long growth 
period from 1998-2008 driven by rising metal prices and demand, punctuated by a minor 
downturn caused by adverse exchange rate movements, and culminating in a dramatic price 
                                                            
8 Author’s calculations from Bloomberg Data and Company Accounts. 
9 Bloomberg data 
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spike (Figure 1). Second, a period of prolonged downturn from 2008 – punctuated by a brief 
rally in 2010-2011 – as metal prices fell.  
PGM mining had developed around a highly labour intensive business model, using 
hazardous drilling and blasting techniques similar to those in gold. This was partly a response 
to challenging geology, in that deposits were predominantly deep underground and in narrow, 
inconsistent reefs which made mechanisation difficult (Stewart, 2015). However, it was 
facilitated by the apartheid migrant labour system, which provided cheap labour and harsh 
disciplinary controls (Bezuidenhout & Buhlungu, 2011). Labour typically accounts for 50%-
60% of operating costs in a conventional labour-intensive PGM mine, and so control of this 
variable is a key determinant of profitability. As a result of new legislation from government 
and trade union pressure, labour costs have increased throughout the post-apartheid period 
(Author, 2018). However, during the first period this was not a significant issue: increases 
were from a low base and metal prices were high enough to make PGM mining a high profit 
margin activity. Shares substantially outperformed the JSE40 index and JSE Mining index, 
peaking at around 10% of total market capitalisation in 2008 (Figure 3). Levels of economic 
value added – returns on capital above the weighted-average cost of capital – were positive 
throughout this first period (Figure 4), and well in excess of the 3% - 4% which mining 
companies reportedly target for new projects (ThomsonReuters, 2014: 15).  
From 2008 onwards, however, lower metal prices have met escalating labour costs, alongside 
increases in other key inputs, notably electricity, and more challenging geological conditions 
as richer, shallower deposits have been extracted. Since then, shares have underperformed 
benchmark indices (Figure 3), with the companies now accounting for less than 1% of market 
value, and unable to achieve returns which meet their cost of capital (Figure 4). 
16 
 
 
Figure 3: Index of platinum stock prices in comparison to the JSE40 and JSE Mining 
Index  
Source: Bloomberg data. 
 
Figure 4: Economic value-added spread, 2000-2014.  
Source: Bloomberg. 
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As discussed in the preceding section, such periods of boom and bust have historically been 
recognised as intrinsic to the nature of extractive industry investment due to the highly 
cyclical nature of demand, and the likelihood of unanticipated gluts or shortfalls in supply 
given the time taken to commission new production capacity. This is more so for platinum 
given its high substitutability and price elasticity of demand. In this case, however, the 
pressures derived from financialisation of the sector and management efforts to satisfy 
shareholder value demands, led to the adoption of strategies which ultimately exacerbated 
this volatility.  
 
4: Strategic responses to financialisation: setting the bar higher 
Following unbundling, PGM mining company management adopted aggressive shareholder 
value delivery strategies. This manifested in, firstly, large cash distributions to shareholders. 
Secondly, aggressive expansion programmes to access new reserves and demonstrate future 
growth prospects. And thirdly, related to this, forms of balance sheet engineering to increase 
leverage and minimise cash reserves as a way of improving key shareholder value metrics and 
reducing the cost of capital. This represented a high-risk strategy for an industry as historically 
volatile as PGM mining. However, it was compelled by capital market competition and 
legitimated by a narrative, adopted by company management, that the ‘commodities super-
cycle’ made conventional precautions unwarranted. Reviewing previous annual reports, 
previous boom phases were viewed with caution as fleeting, and not periods in which to 
increase leverage. For example, in 1987, after two years of record profitability, RPM (the 
predecessor to Amplats) management stated a priority of “continued strengthening of the 
Group’s financial position in order to be better able to withstand a deterioration in market 
conditions” (RMP, 1987: 4; RPM, 1988: 12), and in 1994 on “building cash reserves during 
the good times” (RPM, 1994: 5). This conservativism did not align with the heightened investor 
expectations of the 2000s, in particular for Amplats’ parent company, Anglo American 
(henceforth, Anglo). This was in part a reflection of the political risks accompanying this 
turbulent period of South African history, but also reflected a qualitatively different approach 
to corporate strategy which saw aggressive leveraging during a boom period as excessively 
risky.10 
                                                            
10 Interviews with former mining executives, July-August 2016. 
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Having listed in London, however, Anglo American found itself subject to intensified market 
scrutiny relative to its more cosmopolitan peers. It was derided, from an investment analyst 
perspective, for underperforming its major rivals, Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton and being too 
financially conservative (Credit Suisse, 2006; JPMorgan, 2007). Its responsive attempts to 
create “a focused business to deliver improved returns to our shareholders” involved, firstly, 
shedding assets that lowered group-level returns and removing non-core subsidiaries that were 
not geared to the commodities supercycle (Anglo, 2003: 3; Anglo, 2004-2005). Notably, paper 
manufacturer, Mondi, offered a counter-cyclical hedge but during a commodities boom 
dragged down group-level returns, and so was sold (Investec, 2006). Management 
simultaneously focused on increasing exposure to industrial minerals in demand by China – 
particularly copper and iron ore – through a spree of debt-financed acquisitions of mining assets 
(Anglo, 2004-2007). Finally, to win market approval, in the mid-2000s the company committed 
to an aggressive dividend and share buy-back strategy. This was lauded by Deutsche Bank 
(2006) analysts as “setting the bar higher for industry as a whole”, “leading the way on 
shareholder returns” by Credit Suisse (2006), and “astonishing” by Morgan Stanley in its praise 
of the “new Anglo” (2006). This resulted in $10bn of share buybacks in 2006-2007, with 
dividends per-share increased nearly 250% between 2002-2006.11 Briefly during 2006-07, 
Anglo shares outperformed Rio and BHP.  
Amplats’ own strategy was shaped by this competitive struggle on the London Stock Exchange. 
Recognising its cash generating potential, Anglo had progressively increased its stake in 
Amplats from 50% in 2000 to 80% by 2008. Amplats’ correspondingly adopted an aggressive 
dividend policy to distribute cash upwards to Anglo.12 This was at the expense of the 
company’s balance sheet strength. A 350% increase in dividends per share in 2006 was 
interpreted by UBS as “an attempt to get balance sheet gearing as they [management] indicated 
they are more confident in the duration of this cycle and are happy to have debt” (UBS, 2007: 
5). The dividend cover ratio was lowered to 1, a ‘full distribution’ policy to pay out all net 
profits.13 Subsequent dividend payments of R13.8bn in 2006/07 and R12.3bn in 2007/08 were 
more than was spent on employee costs in those years, despite the company’s high labour 
intensity and full-time workforce of over 50,000. This corresponded with a shift in financial 
position from net cash of R4.9bn at the end of 2006, to net debt of R19bn at the end of 2009.14 
                                                            
11 Company annual reports, various years. 
12 Appendix 1. 
13 Appendix 1. 
14 Appendix 1. 
19 
 
Following a subsequent R12.5bn equity raising in 2010, JPMorgan (2010: 8) analysts noted, 
“[b]orrowing to pay dividends in a cyclical single commodity miner has never been the smart 
thing to do.” 
Implats and Lonmin followed similar paths. Pressured by analysts viewing cash buffers as 
representing a “lazy” balance sheet, Implats management pledged to higher gearing and 
“retuning the benefits of any excess cash to shareholders” (Implats, 2004: 7-14; JPMorgan, 
2006; RBC, 2006; JPMorgan, 2008). Pledging to ensure shareholders were “well rewarded”, 
in 2008, it lowered dividend cover to enable increased payments (Implats, 2008: 16-20).15 Seen 
by analysts as “cash flush” (Macquarie, 2010) even following the crash, the company continued 
paying dividends. With net cash of R8.5bn at the end of its 2007/08 financial year Implats paid 
out R8.5bn of dividends during 2008/09, eventually shifting into a net debt position of R2.3bn 
in 2012 while paying a R3.3bn dividend.16 With benefit of hindsight, BNP Paribas analysts 
(2013) noted this was “an ominous first for a company that has prided itself on balance sheet 
robustness and has in the past issued what now appear to be overly generous dividends”. It was 
forced into a R4bn rights offer in 2015. Lonmin entered financial difficulties earlier and with 
greater severity. The company’s aforementioned restructuring in the early 2000s had generated 
large cash reserves from asset sales, which management worried would create a “less than 
efficient balance sheet” (Lonmin, 2001: 4). This was distributed to shareholders through share 
buybacks and a capital return (HSBC, 2001; Lonmin, 2002).17 As one analyst put it, the 
company had “far exceeded market hopes” in its efforts to deliver shareholder value: 
For those seeking signs of a changed mindset in the management of the so-called ‘heavy 
industries’ after years of boom and bust, and value destruction through over-investment 
in new capacity, the move by Lonmin to return capital to shareholders and gear up to 
20% to improve returns on capital is a very encouraging development indeed (Schroder-
Salomon-Smith-Barney, 2001: 2). 
The company was also highly profitable, described by one as a “cash machine” (JPMorgan, 
2004), but sought to fund its capital expenditure through debt to increase gearing and lower the 
cost of capital (Lonmin, 2002: 3).18  
                                                            
15 Appendix 2 
16 Appendix 2 
17 Appendix 3 
18 Appendix 3 
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Alongside the other two large PGM miners, Lonmin pursued an aggressive expansion strategy 
which increased indebtedness, and ultimately created financial fragility and over-capacity 
which intensified and prolonged the slump.19 As with the increased predilection to distribute 
cash to shareholders at the expense of balance sheet resilience, this increased risk appetite was 
underpinned by narrative. Similar to banks’ pre-2008 crash arguments that securitisation had 
finally eliminated credit risk (Engelen et al, 2011), mining companies justified rapid expansion, 
increased leverage and dividend policies with a ‘this time it’s different’ story: rather than a 
fleeting boom, prices would stay ‘stronger for longer’ in a commodities ‘supercycle’. The term 
was coined by an investment analyst, but adopted widely by mining executives for whom the 
term alleviated doubt and legitimated the sectoral growth narrative used in talking to the 
markets (Humphreys, 2015). As this became a form of prevailing wisdom, failure to 
demonstrate commitment to growth with a suitable pipeline of projects was interpreted 
negatively by the markets as conservatism.  
To this end, Amplats’ management in the early 2000s promised investors a near doubling of 
platinum production by 2006 to 3.5moz/pa (Credit Suisse, 2001), raised to 4.3moz by 2015 in 
2007 (Credit Suisse, 2007). Lonmin progressively raised output targets through the boom, and 
in 2006 pledged to more than double platinum production to over 2moz (Lonmin, 2006: 6). 
These targets were never hit, with companies over-promising and under-delivering. 
Nonetheless, the process was costly. Factors including greater mine depth, unanticipated 
geological and technological challenges and rising input costs led to an increasing disconnect 
between investment and output growth. Amplats’ average annual capital expenditure of R2bn 
in the 1990s rose to an R11bn average in the 2000s in real terms, Impala’s from R1bn to R4.5, 
but without commensurate increases in volume.20 Industry-aggregate capital expenditure per 
ounce rose in real terms from R1,000 in the 1990s to over R4,000 (Venmyn-Deloitte, 2015).  
In addition to large capex increases, Lonmin and Implats also attempted to buy in growth with 
a series of costly and unsuccessful acquisitions near the peak of the boom. Lonmin paid $192m 
in 2009 for Southern Era Platinum, a mine mothballed by Implats in the 1990s and sold to 
Southern for $10m in 1999 (JPMorgan, 2005). This was followed by the $413m acquisition in 
2007 of Afriore’s undeveloped Akanani exploration project, which required an estimated 
additional $700m to bring into production. This was large relative to capital expenditure, which 
was $276m that year (Lonmin, 2007), but justified by the assertion that “[p]latinum has some 
                                                            
19 Appendix 3 
20 Author’s calculations from company accounts. Appendices 1-3. 
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of the best economic fundamentals in the natural resource universe” and that the company was 
determined to position itself to capture growth (Thomson, 2006). The former mine was 
mothballed in 2009, and the latter remains undeveloped and heavily written down (Lonmin, 
2012: 128). Implats, meanwhile, invested heavily in a high-risk acquisition of Zimbabwean 
PGM assets in the early 2000s, and in 2007 acquired the undeveloped Leeukwop project for 
R4.2bn (~$590m) as part of its stated commitment to “deliver superior returns to shareholders 
by focusing on growth” (Implats, 2007: 12 & 25; Implats, 2008: 14). The former was successful 
operationally but investment has been hampered by conflict with the Zimbabwean government 
over indigenisation legislation and control of land, while the latter has still not reached 
production and has been heavily impaired (Implats, 2014: 50). To the edge of the global 
financial crisis in mid-2008, amid signs of a slowdown, the companies maintained that growth 
would continue unabated (Amplats, 2008: 6; Thomson, 2008). 
The excesses derived from efforts to please the markets during the boom exacerbated the 
impacts of the slump. Companies went from enjoying strong, often spectacular, free cash flow 
pre-2008, to mostly negative cash flow after capital expenditure from 2009. This necessitated 
shareholder bailouts in the following years, four times since 2009 in Lonmin’s case. Sums 
raised were comparable to amounts paid out in the euphoric final years of the boom in dividends 
or on ill-fated growth projects. Indeed, for Implats and Amplats, the real-terms proceeds from 
issuance of share capital amounts to just over 10% of dividends and share buybacks over the 
two-decade period. 
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Figure 5: Proceeds from share issuance against dividends and share buybacks (2015 
prices)  
Source: Company annual reports and accounts 
In these changed circumstances, international institutional investors which had piled into South 
African mining during the boom withdrew. Between 2007-2016, 40% of the 50 largest 
shareholders in 2007 – those seeing the largest rewards from the boom – exited their 
investments in the companies.21 South African investors comprised half of Implats shareholder 
base in 2007, but this increased to two thirds by 2016, while for Lonmin, South African 
shareholding rose from just 6% in 2010, to just under 40% in 2016.22 Notably, in both cases 
the Public Investment Corporation (PIC), which manages the Government Employees Pension 
Fund, has become the single largest investor, in Lonmin’s case supporting the heavily-
discounted $400m 2015 rights issue which prevented bankruptcy as a means of safeguarding 
employment.  
To maintain access to capital markets the imperative for the companies was restoring an 
internationally competitive rate of return. Anglo, for example, committed to a group-level 
return on capital employed (ROCE) target of 15%, with capital to be directed to assets with the 
highest potential for returns (Anglo, 2014: 9). Lonmin similarly pledged that capital would be 
allocated to projects offering “no less” than 15% internal rate of return, saying they 
“acknowledged our assets compete for the limited amount of available capital” (Lonmin, 2014: 
18-19). These aspirations proved unrealisable, but they did contribute to the intense labour 
conflict which engulfed the sector in the period 2011-2014. As mentioned above, PGM mining 
had developed around a highly labour-intensive business model, and therefore a key means to 
cut costs was through the workforce. During the slump, it is generally only the more modern 
and mechanised mines which have remained profitable (Author, 2018). In addition, with large 
above ground stocks of platinum developed during the boom, the industry suffered from severe 
over-capacity that was recognised as depressing prices. This combined to create pressures for 
wage moderation, workforce reduction, and the closure or divestment of the most labour-
intensive shafts.  
Simultaneously, however, workers were intensifying campaigns for wage increases, propelled 
by emerging forms of insurgent unionism and inter-union competition (Sinwell, 2016). 
                                                            
21 44% for Amplats, 38% for Implats and 40% for Lonmin. Author’s calculations from Bloomberg data. 
22 Bloomberg data 
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Enduring a harsh and dangerous working environment and abysmal living conditions in the 
large informal settlements in the major mining areas (Makgetla & Levin, 2016), workers began 
demanding a ‘living wage’ of R12,5000. Compelled by the aforementioned financial 
considerations, management attempted to resist these demands, resulting in a wave of lengthy 
and violent strikes in 2011/12 and again in 2014, which stand out as among the most severe 
instances of social conflict in post-apartheid South Africa (Chinguno, 2015; Capps, 2015).  
The workforce for the sector has fallen significantly as part of the adjustment, from a pre-crisis 
peak of 200,000 to 172,000 in 2016. This inevitably entails major social costs in the South 
African context of high poverty and unemployment, where low-wage PGM sector workers on 
average support around 10 dependents (Makgetla & Nevin, 2016). This may have been more 
but for state intervention. Possessing the largest number of mining assets, Amplats in 2012 
announced a strategy to restructure out of older, labour intensive mines representing 50% of 
the workforce, and “transition to a lower-cost, more focused quality portfolio” in its more 
mechanised operations (Amplats, 2014: 37). This was not because the shafts identified for 
closure in the restructuring were irredeemably unprofitable, rather they acted as a drag on 
aggregated group returns (Credit Suisse, 2015; UBS, 2012; Deutsche Bank, 2012; RBC, 2015). 
In its initial proposals, it sought to mothball four shafts, thereby “retaining flexibility for long 
term growth options”, while laying off 14,000 workers – albeit with proposals for re-skilling 
and redeployment of 30% of these (Amplats, 2013; Amplats, 2012: 2-3; ThomsonReuters, 
2013). Government then intervened to attempt to halt the redundancies, reportedly threatening 
to revoke mining licenses (JPMorgan, 2013). Amplats relented, reducing redundancies to 
6,000, and committing to sell rather than mothball the operations (Absa, 2013). In Lonmin’s 
case, state intervention to preserve jobs came in the form of the PIC underwriting the 
aforementioned 2015 rights issue, without which the company faced potential bankruptcy with 
35,000 jobs at risk. With private shareholders shunning the offer, the PIC increased its stake 
from 7% to just over 30%, with the PIC CEO commenting that "[n]ot supporting Lonmin would 
put the company at risk and it could potentially be harmful to the industry and the communities 
where Lonmin operates as well as the economy at large" (McKay, 2015). 
As of the time of writing in 2018, the sector remains in crisis. The most recent manifestation 
has been multiple sales of mining assets, notably to Sibanye-Stillwater, the former gold mining 
company which has purchased mines from Amplats, Aquarius platinum and, most recently, 
Lonmin, to establish itself as the world’s second largest platinum miner. Further redundancies 
are expected (JPMorgan, 2018). While the duration of the slump relates to global platinum 
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market dynamics which have depressed prices, as this section has shown, its severity in terms 
of both financial and social impacts relates in large part to shifts in management strategy in 
response to financialisation. Efforts to generate short term shareholder value in the boom phase 
resulted in high levels of risk taking – in both expansion plans, financial engineering, and 
dividend policies – which placed the companies in a precarious and vulnerable position when 
the crash arrived, and in addition created a large overhang of excess capacity. This had 
distributional consequences, with international investors enjoying the gains from this period 
exiting during the slump, and much of the burden of adjustment in the form of redundancies 
and social unrest falling on workers, communities and the South African state.  
 
6: Conclusion 
As this paper has shown, capital market competition and management efforts to fulfil narratives 
of shareholder value delivery during the boom manifested in aggressive dividend policies, 
high-risk balance sheet engineering, and excessive capital outlays on capacity expansion and 
M&A activity. The result was financial fragility and excess capacity which has exacerbated the 
impact of the slump in subsequent years with severe social consequences. In effect, the 
financialisation of firm strategy served to intensify and amplify the inherent volatility of the 
mining industry. Conventional arguments that such payments to shareholders represent 
necessary reward to shareholders for services rendered in the form of investment and long-term 
stewardship and monitoring of management, are difficult to maintain in this case. With the 
rapid exit of international investors when the boom ended, equity markets functioned more as 
a means of extraction than investment.  
This, and the strategies adopted by the PGM mining companies discussed in this article are in 
some respects similar to those which would be anticipated from other studies of financialisation 
of the firm (e.g. Fligstein & Shin, 2007; Lazonick, 2010: Froud et al, 2006). As argued in 
Section 3, the integration of the companies into global capital markets increased competitive 
pressure to generate higher shareholder returns for internationally mobile institutional 
investors, and compelled the mimetic adoption of strategies of shareholder value delivery 
through balance sheet engineering and large dividend payouts. However, this abstractive 
tendency contradicts the social and materially embedded nature of mining as a land-based 
industry with large up-front capital requirements and long production lead times, that is 
inherently cyclical and volatile (Bridge, 2008; Parker et al, 2017). As the paper argues, these 
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characteristics mean that financialisation compels behaviors in mining firms which run 
somewhat contrary to established understandings of financialisation of the firm, which see 
financialisation as diminishing the inclination toward long-term capital investment. Instead, 
mining firms are compelled to respond rapidly to upswings in the commodities cycle with 
surges of capital investment to create new reserves. In a fashion which resonates with cultural-
political economy approaches to financialisation, this was underpinned by narratives on the 
commodities supercycle which legitimised such risk taking. This, in turn, exacerbated balance 
sheet fragility and excess capacity. The consequences of this heightened instability are likely 
to be particularly severe in a developing country context. This was all the more so in South 
Africa due to the historical circumstances, in which labour-intensive PGM mining is an 
extreme manifestation of the continuing legacies of the apartheid economic model and the path 
dependencies developed around it. Finally, the study exemplifies the manner in which 
financialisation “accentuates the inherent competitiveness of capital valuation” (Bryan, Martin 
& Rafferty, 2008: 467) and intensifies the tensions between the abstractive nature of financial 
valuation and the contextual, material particularities of economic activity (Sullivan, 2013; 
Wigan, 2009; Fields, 2017; Clapp, 2014). While such pressures are replicated across many 
industries and contexts, they are particularly acute in mining by virtue of it being a landed 
industry. Contrary to other forms of industrial activity, it cannot easily respond to these 
pressures, crises of profitability, or instances of social conflict through spatial reconfiguration. 
This is even more so for PGMs compared to other mineral commodity categories given the 
unusual spatial concentration of reserved within South Africa’s Bushveld Complex.  
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